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THE TSA'S NEW X-RAY VISION: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF "BODY-SCAN"
SEARCHES AT DOMESTIC AIRPORT SECURITY
CHECKPOINTS
Tobias W. Mock*

INTRODUCTION

The Transportation Security Administration is currently
testing a new form of airport screening technology that
renders a virtual naked image of the human body.' This socalled "body-scan" technology is earmarked to become the
centerpiece of the "checkpoint of the future," replacing walkthrough metal detectors as the primary means of detecting
personally concealed weapons and contraband.2
The technology is emerging as a result of widespread
deficiencies in present-day search capabilities.'
Since the
events of September 11, 2001, government accountability
auditors have successfully bypassed security checkpoints with
* Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 49; J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law, B.S., Boston University. I would like to thank
Santa Clara University legal writing instructor Patricia Rauch, and my father,
Wayne Mock, for their helpful comments.
1. Leslie Miller, Feds Want See-Through Security, CBS NEWS, June 26,
2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/06/26/tech/main560541.shtml.
2. One Year Later: Have TSA Airport Security Checkpoints Improved?:
Hearing Before the H. R. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 9
(2007) (statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director, and John W. Cooney,
Assistant Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, United States
Government Accountability Office), [hereinafter Kutz Testimony] available at
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071114175647.pdf,
Eileen Sullivan,
Full-Body Scan at Airports Could Replace Walk-Through Metal Detectors, ABC
NEWS, Oct. 11, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=3716778.
3. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T. OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, OIG NO. 04-37, AUDIT OF PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE SCREENING
PROCEDURES AT DOMESTIC AIRPORTS 3-4 (2004) [hereinafter OIG AUDIT],

http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_04-37-0904.pdf.
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weapons and explosives at an alarming rate.4
While
weaknesses exist across all areas of airport security, outdated
technology has been identified as a primary culprit, with
traditional walk-through metal detectors (magnetometers)
leading the way. I
Although recognized by government officials as a
potential remedy for these failures, the intrusive nature of
body-scan technology implicates significant privacy concerns
for the millions of domestic airborne travelers.6 Accordingly,
this comment will attempt to reconcile the competing values
of privacy and security in the context of modern-day airport
searches, with particular consideration given to the
appropriate role, if any, that body-scan technology should
play in the future. Whether the technology should be used as
a part of the mandatory search procedures that are conducted
as a matter of course or as a subsequent search procedure
after a passenger elicits a certain degree of suspicion requires
careful consideration of the competing interests presented by
the technology. 7
Part I of this comment examines the current state of
domestic airport security, including an assessment of current
airport checkpoint procedures and capabilities and an
introduction to the technology behind body-scan x-rays.' Part
II identifies and reconciles the various judicial justifications
for airport searches,9 while part III identifies the particular
Fourth Amendment issue that the technology presents in the
context of routine airport searches.' ° Finally, given the
judicial framework and particularly invasive nature of the
technology, part IV endorses using body-scan searches in the
secondary search layer as an alternative to pat-down
searches; a manner that appropriately considers the
competing interests of privacy and security."

4. See id.; see also Kutz Testimony, supra note 2, at 4.
5. See OIG AUDIT, supra note 3, at 2.
6. See id. at 3, 4 n.5.
7. It is important to note that this comment does not address the specific
issue of whether TSA's definition of "arousal of suspicion" is constitutionally
justified.
8. See discussion infra Part I.A-D.
9. See discussion infra Part II.
10. See discussion infra Part III.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.
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BACKGROUND: MODERN AIRPORT SECURITY

Domestic airport security has undergone significant
transformation since the events of 9/11.12 Among the many
changes include advances in technology, systems, and
processes, and an increased focus on accountability. 13 Despite
these measures, it is clear that significant weaknesses
14
persist.
While these new technologies and processes develop,
courts continue to disagree over how to reconcile the various
layers of airport security with the Fourth Amendment
15
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Although the plain language of the Fourth Amendment sets
forth "reasonableness" as a general benchmark, 6 significant
uncertainty exists as to how the government should proceed
in implementing new technologies without sacrificing the
constitutional rights of American travelers.
A. The TransportationSecurity Administration
Congress acted swiftly to federalize airport security after
the 9/11 attacks. 7 The Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (the "ATSA") transferred operational control of airport
security from the private sector to the Transportation
Security Administration (the "TSA"), an entity created under
the ATSA.'8 The ATSA initiated a "fundamental change in
the way [the government] approaches the task of ensuring the
safety and security of the civil air transportation system."'9
Since its creation in November 2001,20 the TSA has
assumed control of security in at least 315 of the nation's
more than 420 commercial airports, hired and trained a
screening workforce, 2 and deployed thousands of explosive
12. See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960-61, 962 n.6 (9th Cir.
2007).
13. See discussion infra Part I.
14. See discussion infra Part I.C.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Hartwell, 296 F. Supp. 2d 596, 602 (E.D. Pa.
2003), affd, 436 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. OIG AUDIT, supra note 3, at 1.
18. Id.
19. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
reprinted in 2002
H.R. REP. NO. 107-296, at 53-54 (2001) (Conf. Rep.),
U.S.C.C.A.N. 589, 590).
20. OIG AUDIT, supra note 3, at 1.
21. Richard J. Webber, The Partial Reprivatization of Airport Security
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detection systems and x-ray devices to remedy perceived
security weaknesses at airport checkpoints.2 2 Following the
direction of the 9/11 Commission,23 the TSA seeks to carry out
a "layered" security system with a "broad range of interlinked
24
measures that are flexible, mobile, and unpredictable."
Although airport security under the TSA is multifaceted,2 5
checkpoint screening is the primary method of identifying
potential threats.26
B. PassengerScreening
The ATSA authorizes mandatory checkpoint screening by
the TSA.2 ' The three primary elements of the passenger
screening process are human capital, procedures, and
technology. 2 Though independent, the three elements are
designed to interact with one another to create a
comprehensive security system.2 9
1.

Human Capital:TransportationSecurity Officers

Human capital performs an essential function in the
checkpoint screening process. Accordingly, transportation
security officers ("TSOs") are required to complete a
minimum of forty hours of classroom training and sixty hours
Screening: FirstSteps, 40 THE PROCUREMENT LAW. 15, 18 (2005).
22. Kutz Testimony, supra note 2, at 5.
23. One Year Later: Have TSA Airport Security Checkpoints Improved?:
Hearing Before the H. R. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th
Cong. 4 (2007) (statement of Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary, Transportation
Security Administration) [hereinafter Hawley Testimony], available at
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071115110733.pdf.
24. Id. at 1. For example, the TSA cites its overnight implementation and
subsequent modification of standard operating procedures in response to the
threats posed by liquid explosives following the uncovering of the UK bomb plot
in August 2006. Id. at 4. See also Kutz Testimony, supra note 2, at 4.
25. Kutz Testimony, supra note 2, at 4. Other "layers" include "intelligence
gathering and analysis, checking passenger manifests against watch lists, and
employing undercover air marshals." Id. See also discussion infra Part I.B.
26. Kutz Testimony, supra note 2, at 4. In 2006, the TSA screened
708,400,522 passengers and intercepted 13,709,211 prohibited items at security
checkpoints.
Transportation Security Administration, Research Center:
Screening Statistics, http://tsa.gov/research/screeningstatistics.shtm
(last
visited Aug. 30, 2008).
27. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 107-296, at 53-54 (2001), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 589,
590).
28. Kutz Testimony, supra note 2, at 2.
29. See Hawley Testimony, supra note 23, at 1-2.
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of on-the-job training prior to certification2 ° Additionally,
security officers must meet annual recertification standards,
including a standard operating procedures knowledge test, an
image
certification
test,
and
a
practical
skills
demonstration.'
TSO officers follow a standard operating procedure
during passenger screening that includes aspects of procedure
and technology.2
Standard primary search mechanisms
include the use of walk-through magnetometers for passenger
screening as well as x-ray baggage searches.3 Passengers
who repeatedly alarm walk-through or hand-held metal
detectors or otherwise alert TSO officers of potential
wrongdoing are subject to secondary searches.3 4 The TSA
standard operating procedures manual describes the process
that officers must follow during these secondary searches,
which includes, for purposes of our discussion, the use of a
pat-down search.3
2. Present-DayPrimary Screening
Primary screening searches refer to the routine searches
performed on each individual regardless of the level of
suspicion aroused. 6 Primary screening mechanisms include
30. Id. at 5. Officer training is ongoing after certification, as the TSA
annually allocates funds for three million hours of TSO recurrent training. Id.
Additionally, the TSA online learning center ("OLC") makes available over 350
general training and development courses for TSO use. Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations,FY 2005: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Homeland Security of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 108th Cong. 367
(2005) (statement of Admiral David Stone, Acting Administrator,
Transportation Security Administration) [hereinafter Stone Testimony],
available at http://globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress2004h1040323stone.htm.
31. Stone Testimony, supra note 30, at 367. Additional officer testing is
carried out in the threat image protection ("TIP") program, which employs
software that superimposes images of prohibited items on the x-ray screen
during actual operations to determine whether the officer is able to identify the
object. Id. at 368.
32. Kutz Testimony, supra note 2, at 4.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 5; see also discussion infra Part I.B.3.
35. Kutz Testimony, supra note 2, at 5. Secondary searches also include the
use of explosive trace detection ("ETD") swabbing, which detects explosive
vapors and residue. Id. Security officers collect samples by rubbing swabs on
carry on objects or clothing and place the swab in the ETD machine, and the
machine analyzes the sample for traces of explosive materials. Id. at 5 n.7.
36. See Hawley Testimony, supra note 23, at 3; see also United States v.
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most notably the physical searches performed at the
screening checkpoint with magnetometers and baggage
scanning machines."
In addition to physical searches,
however, the TSA employs various other interlinked
measures that include efforts to detect behavioral
abnormalities in passengers, increase visibility of officer
teams, 38 and screen passengers against lists of high-risk
individuals. 9
The TSA's Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
("VIPR") teams are broadly deployed to increase the visible
presence of security personnel.4" The teams are comprised of
TSO officers, Federal Air Marshals, and law enforcement, and
are used in areas away from checkpoints to detect potential
threats.4 1 Many of these individuals are trained in an
advanced observational screening tool to detect potential
wrongdoing.4 2
Screening Passengers by Observational Techniques, or
"SPOT," is a program designed by behavioral expert Mark G.
Frank4 3 that uses objective criteria to determine when
individuals are trying to disguise emotion.4 4 Trained officers
observe passengers and look for both obvious and subtle
suspicious behavioral indicators, like a particular vocal
timbre, gestures, and facial movements. 45 The officers consult
a list of approximately thirty questionable behaviors, each of
Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 2007).
37. See Kutz Testimony, supra note 2, at 4.
38. Hawley Testimony, supra note 23, at 3.
39. Transportation Security Administration, What We Do: Secure Flight
Program, http://www.tsa.gov/what wedo/layers/secureflight/index.shtm (last
visited Aug. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Secure Flight Program].
40. See Hawley Testimony, supra note 23, at 3.
41. Id.
42. See Jonathan Karp & Laura Meckler, Which Travelers Have 'Hostile
Intent'? Biometric Device May Have the Answer, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2006,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB1155517937969347522hgveyRtDDtssKozVPmg6RAAa w 20070813.html?mod=tffmaintff top.
43. Press Release, Nat'l Sci. Found., New Technologies Could Make Airport
Screening More Effective and Less Cumbersome (Oct. 24, 2006), available at
http://www.nsf.gov/news/news-summ.jsp?cntnid=108133.
Frank received his
Ph.D. in social psychology from Cornell and completed post-doctoral work in the
psychiatry department at the University of California at San Francisco; he has
published numerous articles on facial expressions and interpersonal deception.
Id.
44. Karp & Meckler, supra note 42.
45. Id. An example of an obvious behavioral indication is wearing an
extremely large jacket in warm weather. Id.
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which is assigned a numerical score.46 When the score
exceeds a predetermined sum, an officer will approach the
individual for further questioning.
At that point,
approximately eighty percent of individuals are dismissed
without further intrusion.48
However, if the conversation
arouses further suspicion, the passenger may be subject to a
secondary search. 49 The program began in Boston shortly
after 9/11,50 and as of August 2006, was in use at twelve
major airports.5 1
Additionally, acting on a key recommendation by the 9/11
Commission, 2 Homeland Security is currently developing
"Secure Flight," a program designed to conduct uniform
prescreening of passenger information against government
watch lists.53 Currently, prescreening is conducted by the
individual airlines, which, according to the TSA, results in
unnecessary "inconsistencies and misidentifications. 5 4
Under Secure Flight, the TSA will receive basic
passenger information, such as name and itinerary, through
airline reservation systems and will then screen the
information against government watch lists. 55 Depending on
whether the individual is on the "no fly list," or "selectee list,"
the individual will either be prevented from boarding the
aircraft or selected for secondary screening, respectively.5"
While the program continues to raise privacy concerns,5 7
46. Id.
47. Id.
Although the particular line of questioning pursued by SPOT
officers has not been addressed by the court, "routine" questioning of passengers

at airport checkpoints does not amount to custodial interrogation. United
States v. Hartwell, 296 F. Supp. 2d 596, 606 (E.D. Pa. 2003), affd, 436 F.3d 174
(3d Cir. 2006).
48. Karp & Meckler, supra note 42.
49. Id. Despite the objective criteria used by the program, Gregory T.
Nojeim of the ACLU has criticized SPOT for potentially allowing impermissible
criteria, such as race, to become a factor. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. As of August 2006, the program had identified about one hundred
people who were trying to smuggle drugs, use fake identification, or commit
other crimes, but none who were attempting a terrorist attack. Id.
52. Secure Flight Program, supra note 39.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Secure Flight Compared to Predecessor Program CAPPS II, AMERICAN
CIVIL

LIBERTIES

UNION,

Mar.

http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/15304res2005O329.html.

29,

2005,
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the TSA claims that it will provide a more equitable and
consistent matching process than the current airline-operated
system.58 Accordingly, Secure Flight, scheduled to go online
in 2008, seeks to streamline the screening process, thereby
reducing the number of false positive tests.5 9
Along similar lines, the TSA and private industry operate
a registered traveler program that provides expedited
security screening for those who volunteer to undergo a
security threat assessment.6 ° Once qualified as a registered
traveler, an individual has access to enhanced customer
service, discounts, and reduced waiting times at security
checkpoints.6 1 The program is intended to offer heightened
security to frequent travelers by encouraging participating
entities to implement new technologies for use in the
program.6 2
3.

Present-DaySecondary Screening

Approximately fifteen percent of domestic airline
passengers are subject to secondary "pat-down" searches.6 3
According to the TSA, a number of circumstances can justify
secondary screening, including random selection, a failed
walk-through or hand-held magnetometer search, and where
a passenger otherwise raises a "red flag," by, for example,
purchasing a one-way plane ticket or alerting a government

58. Secure Flight Program, supra note 39.
59. Id.
60. Registered Traveler Interoperability Pilot Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 44275,
44276
(July
30,
2008),
available
at
http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/registered-traveler interoperability-pilot-progra
m 73 fr44275.pdf. To enroll in the registered traveler program, applicants
provide biographic and biometric data to participating airports and airlines as
well as TSA approved service providers. Id. The applicant's identity is checked
against terrorist related watch-lists maintained by TSA. Id.
61. Id. Participants include several airports and air carriers such as the
San Francisco International Airport, Orlando International Airport, Air France,
and British Airways, among others. Transportation Security Administration,
Our
Approach:
Registered
Traveler
Overview,
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/rt/index.shtm (last visited Aug. 30, 2008).
62. Registered Traveler Interoperability Pilot Program, supra note 60.
63. Sara Kehaulani Goo, Airport Pat-Down Protocol Changed: Women
Complained that Security Checks Were Humiliating,WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2004,
at E01. Other secondary search procedures beside pat-downs, such as detailed
baggage inspections, are not relevant for purposes of this discussion, which is
limited to search procedures conducted on individuals themselves, rather than
on their personal belongings or luggage.

2009]

THE TSA'S NEW X-RAY VISION

watch list. '
Since 2001, the TSA has implemented stricter and more
extensive secondary search procedures at airport checkpoints,
including modifications to the pat-down search protocols.65
Present day pat-down search procedures are often described
as overly invasive and draw significant complaints from the
traveling public.66 While the searches are conducted on a
same-sex basis, pat-downs require contact with sensitive
parts of the body, including the chest and thighs.6 7
Furthermore, screening officers conducting the search may,
under certain circumstances, expand the scope to even more
intimate and sensitive parts of the body, such as under and
in-between a woman's breasts.68
While in recent years the TSA has slightly scaled back
pat-down searches,6 9 many travelers continue to describe the
searches as invasive and humiliating. °
In response to
hundreds of reported complaints from passengers, the TSA is
currently developing potentially less-intrusive technologies
and procedures to replace pat-downs.7 1
4. Advances in Technology and Search Procedures
The TSA employs modern technology in addition to walkthrough and handheld magnetometers and baggage x-ray
systems.7 2
Explosive detection systems ("EDS"), and
explosive trace detection ("ETD") devices are widely used to
detect potential threats. 73 For example, General Electric64. Transportation Security Administration, Research: Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.tsa.gov/researchlprivacy/faqs.shtm (last visited Aug. 30,
2008). For commentary on the government watch list programs, see Ryan
Singel, How to Get Off a Government Watch List, WIRED, Apr. 16, 2007,
available
at
http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/04/watchlist2.
65. Jessica D. Lew, Secondary Screening Proceduresfor Airports: Putdowns
for Pat-downs, 19 LAWORLD: INT'L Bus. BRIEFING 1, 2 (2005), available at
http://www.makdap.com.au/docs/LAWorld%20Vol%2019.pdf.
66. Id. ("Many women have reported rough, rude, and humiliating
manhandling, and sometimes even overtly sexual groping by security officials.").
67. William Saletan, Digital Penetration: Invasion of the Naked BodyScanners, SLATE, Mar. 3, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/ 2160977/pagenum/all.
68. Goo, supra note 63.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Stone Testimony, supra note 30, at 368.
73. See id. Use of EDS and ETD devices are identified as the key to
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manufactured "EntryScan" devices are capable of detecting
explosives and narcotics by emitting puffs of air around the
passenger in order to dislocate and detect traces of various
substances.74 The technology is currently used both randomly
and as a secondary search mechanism.7 5
Looking to the future, the TSA is taking a proactive
approach to developing screening technology and search
procedures.7 6 As of 2004, the TSA and Department of
Homeland Security were actively funding over 200 research
77
and development projects related to transportation security.
In addition to body-scan technology, current projects include
bottled liquid scanners, advanced technology x-rays,
automated explosive detection systems," and biometric
devices, among others.79 The TSA is also actively adjusting
search procedures and officer development programs in
response to threats and perceived vulnerabilities.80 Despite
these efforts, however, government audits of security
checkpoints have uncovered numerous weaknesses and are
currently forcing the TSA to re-evaluate all aspects of its
aviation security programs."'
C. Exposed Security Weaknesses
Widespread government audits of security checkpoints
compliance with the 2005 statutory requirement for full electronic screening of
checked baggage. Id.
74. Press Release, Transportation Security Administration, Tampa
International Airport is TSA Test Bed for Explosives Trace Detection Portals
(Aug.
3,
2004),
available
at
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2004/pressrelease_0474.shtm.
75. Id.
76. Hawley Testimony, supra note 23, at 6. "TSA concurs with the final
[GAO] suggestion to continue to develop and deploy new technology." Id.
77. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO No. 04-890, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY R&D: TSA AND DHS ARE RESEARCHING AND DEVELOPING
TECHNOLOGIES, BUT NEED TO IMPROVE R&D MANAGEMENT 3 (2004), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04890.pdf. In 2004, TSA allocated 79.5% of
its $159 million R&D budget for aviation-related security projects, while
Homeland Security allocated 71.9% of its $87 million R&D budget in a similar
manner. Id. at 4 tbl.1. Other federal agencies such as the Department of
Transportation and NASA also have funded transportation security. Id. at 4.
78. Hawley Testimony, supra note 23, at 6.
79. Karp & Meckler, supra note 42.
80. Hawley Testimony, supra note 23, at 1. The TSA frequently modifies its
screening program based on a number of factors, including passenger feedback,
risk based planning, and internal review. Kutz Testimony, supra note 2, at 4.
81. Kutz Testimony, supra note 2, at 9.
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have been underway since 9/11.2 The results have exposed a
security system that is unable to detect modern terrorist
weapons.8 3 While opportunities for improvement exist across
all aspects of security, there is a general consensus regarding
the need to enhance detection capabilities through
implementation of new technology. 4
1. Areas of Vulnerability at Security Checkpoints
The Department of Transportation's Office of the
Inspector General tested security checkpoints at the direction
of President Bush between November 2001 and July 2002.5
The tests indicated several areas of vulnerability in officer
training, equipment and technology, procedures, and
management. 6 As a result, the TSA created the Office of
Internal Affairs and Program Review ("OIAPR"), which
developed criteria to evaluate security systems nationwide.8
In 2003, Homeland Security implemented its own
undercover tests to asses the detection capabilities of airport
security systems.8 8
The tests included hundreds of
investigations at different categories of airports and
concluded in November 2003.9 Officials administering the
tests met with OIAPR prior to and after the tests to obtain
and review security directives and modify standard operating
procedures. 90 Recommendations included increased recurrent
training for security officers, more attentive management to
"ensure effective, vigilant, and courteous screening,"' and
82. Id. at 1; see, e.g., OIG AUDIT, supra note 3.
83. See Kutz Testimony, supra note 2.
84. OIG AUDIT, supra note 3, at 4. The U.S. Government Accountability
Office highlighted three areas in need of improvement: technology, procedure,
and human resources. Kutz Testimony, supra note 2, at 1-2.
85. OIGAUDIT, supra note 3, at 1.

86. Id. at 1-2.
87. Id. at 2.
88. Id. Testing was completed at fifteen airports and included undercover
agents attempting to pass security checkpoints with various prohibited items.
Id.
89. Id. "Commercial airports are categorized based on the number of
annual enplanements. The nation's busiest airports are termed Category X
airports while airports with fewer enplanements are categorized as Category I,
Category II, or Category III." OIG AUDIT, supra note 3, at 2 n.2.
90. Id. Homeland Security also visited the transportation security lab in
New Jersey to discuss their test methodology and learn about the technology in
use at various airports. Id.
91. Id. at 5.
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development and implementation of new technology. 92
Homeland Security completed a second round of aviation
security screening tests between November 2004 and
February 2005. 9" Although TSA had taken steps to follow
previous recommendations, the report stated that "the lack of
improvement since [its] last audit indicat[ed] that significant
improvement in performance may not be possible without
greater use of technology."94 This conclusion was based in
part on the fact that a majority of the failures occurred
notwithstanding the diligent and proper performance of the
screening officers.95
Based on this finding, Homeland
Security recommended that the TSA "aggressively pursue the
development
and
deployment
of innovations
and
improvements to aviation security technologies, particularly
for checkpoint screening."96 Homeland Security specifically
recommended giving preference to body-scanning devices
"that will enable the screening workforce to better detect both
weapons and explosives."9"
2. TSA Security Audits
In response to these audits, TSA created the Aviation
Screening Assessment Program ("ASAP") to expand covert
testing and provide statistics to further develop security
systems. 98 Over a six-month period beginning in April 2007,
ASAP performed thousands of covert tests designed to assess
threats, including those specifically posed by liquid and other
non-metal explosives. 99 Additionally, the TSA itself conducts
92. Id. at 1-4. Technology discussed in the report include multi-view x-ray
systems for baggage screening, backscatter x-ray, and the TIP program. Id. at
3-4.
93. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T. OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, OIG NO. 05-16, FOLLOw-UP AUDIT OF PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE
SCREENING PROCEDURES AT DOMESTIC AIRPORTS 1 (2004), available at

http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_05-16_MarO5.pdf.
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id. ("A 'pass' occurred if the object was identified by screening personnel
and prevented from being carried into the sterile area through the screening
checkpoint or being put into the baggage system downstream from the checked
baggage screening location. A 'fail' occurred when the object was not detected at
the screening checkpoint, or the checked bag was cleared for flight.").
96. Id.
97. Id. at 3.
98. Hawley Testimony, supra note 23, at 7.
99. Id. Testing methodology was based in large part on the threat posed by
the British bomb plot:
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over a thousand covert tests for improvised explosive devices
("IEDs") and improvised incendiary devices ("IIDs") and
70,000 electronic image tests every day.100
The TSA has remained secretive about the specific
results of these audits.0 1
However, the Government
Accountability Office was particularly forthcoming in a
November 15, 2007 preliminary report detailing the result of
a series of tests performed by the Office. 0 2 The report showed
that investigators were successful in passing through security
checkpoints with components for "several" IEDs and IIDs: 103
Our tests clearly demonstrate that a terrorist group, using
publicly available information and few resources, could
cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the
safety of passengers by bringing prohibited IED and IID
components through security checkpoints. Given our
degree of success, we are confident that our investigators
would have been able to evade transportation security
officers at additional airports had we decided to test
them.104

The preliminary report led to immediate action from the
TSA, setting in motion a plan to develop and implement a
technologically advanced "checkpoint of the future."105
The discovery of this bomb plot, in which terrorists allegedly sought to
detonate [IEDs] in airplanes as they crossed the Atlantic Ocean, caused
TSA to substantially modify its screening procedures-all liquids, gels,
and aerosols with some exceptions were banned from being carried
through passenger screening checkpoints and onto aircraft until the
plot was further investigated.
Kutz Testimony, supra note 2, at 1.
100. Hawley Testimony, supra note 23, at 7. TSA Administrator Kip Hawley
claims that tests are conducted at "every checkpoint, every shift, everyday, [at]
every one of our four hundred fifty some airports." Bob Orr, GAO: Bomb Parts
Snuck Past Airport Checkpoints, CBS NEWS,
Nov.
14, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/14/eveningnews/printable350279l.sht
ml.
101. See Kutz Testimony, supra note 2, at 1 n.1, 2, 2 n.3.
102. Id. at 1. The tests were completed at nineteen unspecified airports. Id.
103. Id. at 2. The particular device components and methods of concealment
are classified. Id.
104. Id. at 9-10.
105. Id. at 9.
The Government Accountability Office issued a more
comprehensive report on the tests, along with recommendations to the TSA, in
July 2008. Aviation Security: An Update (2008): Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Aviation of the H. Comm. On Transportationand Infrastructure,110th Cong.
(2008) (statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Dir. of Homeland Security and Justice
Issues,
Gov't
Accountability
Office),
http://transportation.house.gov/Media/File/Aviation/20080724/GAOCathleen%

226

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vo1:49

D. The "Checkpoint of the Future": Body-Scanning
Technology
The TSA's investment in threat detection technologies
has increased significantly with the emergence of liquid and
other modem explosive devices such as those uncovered in
the British terrorist plot of 2006.06
The non-metallic
properties of these emerging threats have rendered
magnetometers obsolete and left the TSA scrambling for

answers. 107
The technologies at the forefront of this effort are two
kinds of "whole-body" scanning machines that utilize
"backscatter" x-ray and "millimeter wave" technologies,
respectively, to detect items concealed under layers of
clothing.' °
While utilizing different technologies, both
machines penetrate clothing but not skin, allowing the
screening officer to view an image of the human form along
with hidden items of "unusual density."10 9
1.

BackscatterX-ray

Backscatter x-ray technology uses narrow, low-intensity
x-rays that deflect off human skin to display an image of the
human form."O The technology offers a distinct security
advantage over magnetometers, which cannot detect many of
the substances used in modern explosive devices."' The

20Berrick- 7 24 -08%2OAvHrng%2Oon%2OAviation%2OSecurity.pdf.
106. See Michael Chertoff, Editorial, We Must Remain Flexible, USA TODAY,
Aug.
15,
2006,
at
9A,
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2006-08-15-chertoffsecurity_x.htm.
107. Saletan, supra note 67; see also Transportation Security Administration,
Our
Approach:
Mythbusters,
http://www.tsa.gov/approachlmythbusters/liquids-ban.shtm
(last visited Aug.

30, 2008).
108. See Transportation Security Administration, Our Approach: Whole Body
Imaging, http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/body-imaging.shtm
(last visited
Sept. 11, 2008).
109. Saletan, supra note 67.
110. Press Release, Transportation Security Administration, TSA Unveils
Backscatter Technology Testing at Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport, Feb. 23, 2007,
http'//www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2007/press-release_02232007.shtm. The level
of x-ray exposure from backscatter machines is equivalent to approximately
fifteen minutes of exposure to naturally occurring radiation, such as sunlight.

Id.
111. See Miller, supra note 1. For example, Rep. John Mica pointed out that
Richard Reid, convicted of trying to blow up a trans-Atlantic jetliner after
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machines have been undergoing testing at Phoenix's Sky
Harbor International Airport since February 2007,112 and
additional pilot programs are now underway in Los Angeles,
Baltimore, Denver, Albuquerque, New York's Kennedy
Airport, and Reagan National in Washington, D.C. 13
The pilot programs are operated on a voluntary basis;
passengers subject to secondary searches have the choice
between a pat-down and body-scan. 1 4 While comprehensive
tests results are yet unavailable, the TSA estimates that
more than ninety percent of Phoenix air passengers have
chosen body-scans over pat-down searches. 15 Currently, the
TSA intends to continue further testing to allow the TSA "to
determine the role the[] technolog[y] will play in the
future.

116

2. Millimeter Wave Technology
Millimeter wave technology utilizes electromagnetic
waves to render a three-dimensional image of the body." 7
The energy emitted by millimeter wave technology is 10,000boarding the airplane with explosives in his shoes, walked through metal
detectors several times before boarding the plane. Id. TSA officials say he
would not have successfully bypassed screening checkpoints had backscatter
devices been in use. Id.
112. Transportation Security Administration, Our Approach: Whole Body
Imaging, supra note 108. The technology has been used for years in all sorts of
security situations, from prisons and U.S. Customs checkpoints, to South
African diamond mines. Thomas Frank, Phoenix Test Site for TSA X-Ray:
ACLU Objects to 'Virtual Strip Search,' USA TODAY, Aug. 22, 2008, at 1A,
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-11-30-tsaxray-x.htm. See also Miller, supra note 1.
113. Thomas Frank, 10 Airports Install Body Scanners: Devices Can Peer
Under Passengers' Clothes, USA TODAY, June 6, 2008, at 3A, available at
www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20080606/abodyscanO6.art.htm.
114. See Press Release, Transportation Security Administration, TSA
Unveils Backscatter Technology Testing at Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport, supra
note 110; see also Transportation Security Administration, Our Approach:
Whole Body Imaging, supra note 108.
115. Transportation Security Administration, Our Approach: Whole Body
Imaging, supra note 108. Cf.Access Intelligence, LLC, TSA Tests Millimeter
Wave Screening at Phoenix Sky Harbor, AIR SAFETY WEEK, Oct. 15, 2007,

http://www.aviationtoday.com/asw/categories/commercial/16516.htm
(as
of
October 2007, seventy-nine percent of the public had opted to try backscatter
over the pat-down).
116. See Hawley Testimony, supra note 23, at 7-8.
117. Press Release, Transportation Security Administration, TSA Announces
Bi-coastal Launch of Millimeter Wave Imaging Technology, (Apr. 17, 2008),
available at http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2008/0417.shtm.
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Like backscatter, the
times less than a cell phone.11
millimeter wave machine is able to display metallic and
nonmetallic items hidden below clothing, including plastic
and liquid weapons and explosives,119 albeit with a slightly

lower resolution. 120
Millimeter machines are being tested alongside
backscatter scanners on the same voluntary basis and in the
The TSA recently announced it will
same airports. 12 '
purchase and deploy thirty additional machines by the end of
2008.122
3.

123

Privacy Concerns

While praised for their detection capabilities, 124 body125
scans present alarming privacy concerns for air travelers.
118. Id.
119. See Transportation Security Administration, Our Approach: Whole Body
Imaging, Millimeter Wave, http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/mwave.shtm (last
visited Sept. 11, 2008).
120. Access Intelligence, LLC, supra note 115.
121. See Transportation Security Administration, Our Approach: Whole Body
Imaging, supra note 108; see also Press Release, Transportation Security
Administration, TSA to Conduct First Real-World Test of Cutting-Edge
at
Technology
(Oct.
21,
2004),
available
Backscatter
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2004/press-release-0527.shtm. 122.
Pilots
122. Press Release, Transportation Security Administration, TSA
Millimeter Wave Technology at Miami International Airport; Advanced
(July
21,
2008),
X-Ray
also
Deployed,
Technology
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2008/0721.shtm.
123. Other concerns presented by the use of new technology and not
addressed in this comment include those of speed, cost, and size. Price
estimates of backscatter machines are between $100,000 and $200,000 per
machine. Miller, supra note 1. Although size estimates vary depending on the
manufacturer, the largest machine is four feet by seven feet by ten feet, which is
.awfully big for an airport lobby." Id. (quoting Randal Null, Chief Technology
Officer, American Science and Engineering, Inc.). Time estimates are less than
ten seconds per scan, and less than one minute for the entire process. Press
Release, Transportation Security Administration, TSA Unveils Backscatter
Technology Testing at Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport, supra note 110. The impact
of these concerns impliedly depends on how the machines are ultimately used.
For example, speed and cost would be of utmost concern if the machines are
used as a mandatory check for each passenger, as many more machines, and
more searches, would be necessary. For purposes of this comment, which
recommends that the machines be used as a secondary search mechanism, these
concerns would appear to be less burdensome.
124. See Press Release, Transportation Security Administration, TSA
Unveils Backscatter Technology Testing at Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport, supra
note 110.
125. Miller, supra note 1. Susan Hallowell, director of the TSA security
laboratory, after hiding weapons on her person and entering the backscatter
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In its unprocessed form, the technology produces images
described as "so sharp that the shape of a person's navel is
126
visible, along with the shapes of other, more private parts."
The American Civil Liberties Union (the "ACLU") likens
the technology to a "virtual strip search" that is highly
invasive and not narrowly tailored, absent probable cause, to
meet the needs of airport security. 2 7 In response to the TSA
pilot program in Phoenix, the ACLU's Timothy D. Sparapani
appeared before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation to condemn the TSA's
authorization and funding of body-scan machines.12
His
concerns included that use of the machines will lead to
unnecessary secondary searches, 29 that passengers would be
required to display personal details of their bodies, 3 ° and the
possibility that the images could be reproduced or appear on
the Internet.13 Concerns also exist over the potential for
selective or improper use of the technology based on cultural
machine, stated that the technology "basically makes you look fat and nakedbut you see all this stuff." Id.
126. Airport Body Search May Reveal More Than Passengers Know, CABLE
NEWS

NETWORK,

Aug.

21,

2000,

http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TRAVELNEWS/08/21lbodysearch.ap/index.html.
For a vivid example of an image produced by the technology without the use of
built-in
privacy
software,
visit
http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/cctv/bodysearch.gif.
127. Saletan, supra note 67.
128. Aviation Security: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Sparapani
Testimony] (statement of Timothy D. Sparapani, Legislative Counsel, American
Civil Liberties Union), http://www.aclu.org/privacy/gen/24856leg200604O4.html
(last visited Sept. 17, 2008). The ACLU has outlined what they believe to be the
principles of airline security, which include (1) that new security technology
must be genuinely effective; (2) the level of privacy intrusion should reflect the
level of risk; (3) those technologies that reduce the gravest threats must be
implemented first; (4) technologies must focus on accomplishing the critical
objective that authorizes their application; (4) minimally intrusive screening
technologies should be implemented in lieu of ineffective passenger prescreening proposals, such as Secure Flight and Registered Traveler; and (5)
Security measures should be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner. Id.
129. Id. "Even the presence of a seemingly innocuously shaped item, such as
a prosthetic device or implant, will require subsequent (and potentially
humiliating) verification." Id.
130. Id. (explaining that passengers expect to keep personal details, "such as
evidence of mastectomies, colostomy appliances, penile implants, catheter tubes,
and the size of their breasts or genitals" private).
131. Elisabeth Salemme, Backlash on Backscatter, TIME, Jan. 4, 2007,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1574165,00.html
(quoting ACLU "privacy expert" Jay Stanley).
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132

or racial factors.
The TSA has taken steps to remedy some of these
concerns.
First, manufacturers now integrate software
systems into the machines that distort the images they
produce. 133 The result is an image of the human form that
blurs many intimate details of the body, including the face,
34
but that retains some ability to display concealed items.
Described as a "chalk outline of a person," the image
generated by the masking software sacrifices a degree of
detection capability, as the blurred images "start to lose the
ability to [detect] ... C4" explosives.13
Second, the TSA has guaranteed that the officer viewing
station will be remotely located. 136 The officer attending the
passenger will not view the images and the remotely located
officer will not be able to associate the image with the person
being screened. 137 The remote screening officer will also be
the same sex as the passenger.' 38 Third, the manufacturer
contends that it is not possible for the screening officer to
save, transmit, print, or otherwise store the images. 39 All
images are immediately and automatically deleted from the
0
system after viewing. 14
The TSA has stood confidently behind these measures as
adequate remedies to the privacy concerns posed by bodyscanning devices.'
In fact, the TSA stated that the
132. Sparapani Testimony, supra note 128. It is unclear, however, whether
body-scans would illicit additional concerns in this regard beyond those
presented in the context of magnetometer and pat-down searches.
133. Frank, supra note 113.
134. Id. A similar system is in development using electromagnetic waves.
Id.
135. Press Release, Transportation Security Administration, TSA Unveils
Backscatter Technology Testing at Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport, supra note 110.
136. Id.
137. Id.

138. Barbara Yost, Nudity Has Become an Option, GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto),
Apr.
25,
2007,
at
R6,
available
at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070425.wphoenix25/B
NStory/PersonalTech/home.
139. American Science & Engineering, Inc., TSA Z Backscatter Pilot: TSA
Initiates Pilot Testing of Privacy Enhanced SmartCheck Personnel Screening
System,
http://www. as-e.com/products-solutions/tsa z_backscatter.pilot.asp
(last visited Sept. 11, 2008).
140. See id.

141. Frank, supra note 113. TSA Assistant Administrator Randy Null stated
in an interview with USA Today that the TSA is now "very comfortable" with
the privacy protections offered by the modern systems. Frank, supra note 112.
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machines could replace walk-through magnetometers and
142
become a primary search mechanism in the near future.
However, privacy groups remain skeptical and continue to
warn of the possibility of "widespread use-and abuse" of the
technology.

II. AIRPORT SEARCHES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment secures "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable
searches and seizures."4
The reasonableness of a search is
determined "by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to
which [the search] intrudes upon an individual's privacy and,
on the other, the degree to which it is needed
for the
145
promotion of a legitimate government interest."
A balance between these competing interests is most
commonly met where the government produces a warrant
establishing probable cause. 146 In the context of airport
searches, however, probable cause, or even a minimal level of
individualized suspicion, does not set the constitutional floor
147
for protection.
Warrantless airport searches, including mandatory
magnetometer searches, are frequently justified based on
their use as part of a general regulatory scheme "aimed at a
group or class of people rather than a particular person."148
The
Supreme
Court
has
repeatedly
upheld
the
constitutionality of these so-called "administrative searches"
"where the risk of public safety is substantial and real."1 49
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Barry Steinhardt, head of the ACLU's technology and
liberty program).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
145. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (quoting
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
146. See Antoine McNamara, Note, The "Special Needs" of Prison, Probation,
and Parole, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 209, 212 n.11 (2007) (citing Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990)) (holding that the general Fourth Amendment
standard requires a warrant outlining (1) the scope of the search, and (2) that
the search is supported by probable cause that it will uncover evidence of a
crime); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (citations
omitted) (holding that probable cause "exist[s] where the known facts and
circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the
belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found").
147. See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007).
148. People v. Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d 850, 851-52 (N.Y. 1992).
149. Id. at 852. The Court has not yet explicitly held that airport searches
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Although mandatory airport searches are routinely upheld in
this manner, the predicate justifications vary between
"general reasonableness," "consent," and the "stop and frisk"
rationale of Terry v. Ohio.15 °
A. "Terry" Stops
The Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio held that a
warrantless search by a law enforcement official is
constitutional, provided that it is "strictly circumscribed by
the exigencies which justify its initiation." 5 ' Therefore, a
search for weapons by an officer who is fearful of immediate
harm must be "limited to that which is necessary for the
discovery of weapons . . . and may realistically be
characterized as something less than a 'full' search."" 2
The Fourth Circuit applied the Terry search rationale to
justify airport magnetometer searches in United States v.
Epperson.153 The court concluded that the Terry exception,
meant to protect "others . . . in danger," 154 extends to
protection of the general public in the context of airport
searches. Accordingly, the court applied the Terry balancing
approach, holding that an airport search must be "justified at
its inception," and "reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place." 5' Noting that magnetometer searches are minimally
invasive, the court held that a slight invasion of privacy is
warranted in light of the strong governmental interest in
public safety." 6

are permissible administrative searches, but has "[oln three occasions . . .
suggested that airport screening searches are constitutionally reasonable
administrative searches." Aukai, 497 F.3d at 959 n.2 (citing Chandler v. Miller,
520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47-48
(2000); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 (1989)).
150. Gibson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 747, 757-58 (Tex. App. 1996). For an
argument in favor of a new justification for preflight passenger searches under
the Fourth Amendment, see Steven R. Minert, Square Pegs, Round Hole: The
Fourth Amendment and Preflight Searches of Airline Passengersin a Post-9/ 11
World, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1631, 1660-67 (2006).
151. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968).
152. Id.
153. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972).
154. Id. at 772 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).
155. Id. at 771 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
156. See id.
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B. Implied Consent
Some courts justify administrative searches where
consent to the search is "voluntary, unequivocal, specific and
freely and intelligently given rather than resulting from
duress or coercion."15 7 Some courts, including the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits, have applied the justification to the
context of airport searches, where consent to
the screening
15 8
process is considered implied and irrevocable.
Under the consent doctrine, all individuals who present
themselves for entry on an airplane, regardless of suspicion,
are subject to a reasonable search.' 59 Therefore, consent
alone, while considered as an element in favor of justifying a
given search, does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness requirement. Instead, consent-based searches
require a balancing of public necessity, effectiveness, and
60
degree of intrusion. 1
There is a general consensus that present-day primary
search procedures, namely magnetometer searches, satisfy
the consent-based balancing inquiry.'
First, airport
searches invoke significant public safety concerns; courts
often describe the threat of airline terrorism as
"unquestionably
grave
and
urgent."'6 2
Second,
magnetometers, at least prior to the emergence of body-scans,
"have every indicia of being the most efficacious that could be
used."163 Finally, courts applying the consent doctrine hold
that magnetometer searches are justifiably invasive, given
both the minimally invasive nature of the technology and the
reduced expectation of privacy inherent in the so-called
"voluntary" search.'

157. Gibson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 747, 757 n.3 (Tex. App. 1996) (citing
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973)).
158. United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773, 776 (11th Cir. 1984); see also
United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1277-76 (5th Cir. 1973).
159. See Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1276.
160. Id. at 1275. The Eleventh Circuit also adopted the Skipwith test.
Herzbrun, 723 F.2d at 775.
161. See United States v. Hartwell, 296 F. Supp. 2d 596, 602 (E.D. Pa. 2003),
aff/d, 436 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006).
162. Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 901 (9th Cir. 1973)).
163. Id. (quoting Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275).
164. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272.
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C. General Reasonableness
Some courts justify airport searches under a general
reasonableness standard "since as a practical matter, an
airport search could not be subjected to the warrant
requirement"
typically
mandated
by the
Fourth
5
Amendment."
Courts rejecting the implied consent
justification cite the inherent governmental coercion involved
in an election between submitting to a search and exercising
one's constitutional right to travel.166
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Aukai applied the
general reasonableness justification, expressly rejecting
implied consent as a justification for airline administrative
searches.167 In Aukai, the court upheld the secondary search
of a passenger who failed to present a valid identification to
security officers. 168
Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit
justified the use of a magnetometer and subsequent pat-down
search of Daniel Aukai because it was "no more extensive nor
intensive than necessary, in light of current technology, to
detect the presence of weapons or explosives," and it was
"confined in good faith to that purpose."'69 Similar to the
consent doctrine and the Terry exception, Aukai requires that
the search be "well-tailored to protect personal privacy,
escalating in invasiveness only after a lower level of screening
disclosed a reason to conduct a more probing search."'7 °
The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania articulated a similar multi-step search test
in United States v. Hartwell.'7 The Hartwell court upheld
the actions of an officer who frisked the pocket of a traveler
who repeatedly failed walk-through and hand-held

165. Hartwell, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (quoting United States v. Albarado,
495 F.2d 799, 804 (2d Cir. 1974)).
166. Gibson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 747, 757 n.3 (Tex. App. 1996) (citing
Albarado, 495 F.2d at 807); see also United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884, 886
(8th Cir. 1973)).
167. United States v. AUkai, 497 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2007). According to
the court, administrative searches rely on statutory authority rather than on a
theory of implied consent. Id. at 960-61 (citing United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311, 315 (1972)).
168. Aukai, 497 F.3d at 963.
169. Id. at 962 (quoting United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir.
1973)).
170. Id. (quoting United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2006)).
171. Hartwell, 296 F. Supp. 2d 596.
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magnetometer searches. 7 2 The court concluded that the
officers "had exhausted all purely voluntary means of
resolving the alarm" by resorting first to handheld metal
detection prior to conducting the pat-down. 173 Therefore, the
least restrictive search available to the officers at that point
was either to request that Hartwell produce the item, or in
the alternative (upon his non-compliance), to conduct a patdown search to produce it themselves. 1 74 Accordingly, the
"general reasonableness" doctrine requires that the search be
tailored to the particular harm presented at each security
"layer."
D. A Common Theme: Proportionality
Despite their varied formulae, the tests based on Terry,
"consent," or "general reasonableness" each articulate a
substantially similar balancing approach that requires
proportionality at each security "layer.' 17 Accordingly, the
administrative airport search justifications are reconcilable in
that they all set forth a similar base-line reasonableness test,
albeit with slightly different considerations.
First, the prevailing distinction between the three
doctrines, the element of implied consent, is largely irrelevant
for purposes of our discussion. 7 6 Implied consent, where
applicable, merely serves as a justification for invoking a
primary search, which, as is pointed out in Epperson, is a
separate inquiry into whether the scope of the search is
reasonable. 7 7 Therefore, once the primary airport search is
invoked, consent does not factor into what kind of search is
conducted. Since our inquiry focuses on the nature of the
primary search, rather than whether a primary search is
itself warranted, the distinction presented by the consent
doctrine is largely irrelevant.
Second, even if relevant, the consent doctrine is largely
inconsistent with more recent administrative search

172.
173.
174.
175.
States
296 F.
176.
177.

See id. at 603-04.
Id. at 604.
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007); United
v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hartwell,
Supp. 2d 596 (E.D. Pa., 2003), affd, 436 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006).
See Aukai, 497 F.3d at 959-60.
United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1972).
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jurisprudence. "Consent" is given, as a matter of law, only
where the individual submits to the search freely and without
coercion."' Therefore, "consent," as recognized in more recent
case law, is not invoked where an individual must elect
between submitting to a government-operated search and
abstaining from air travel.17 9 Rather, such a decision invokes
coercion, rendering any consideration of the element of
consent inappropriate. 8 0
Absent the element of "consent," the three justifications
are substantially similar: Terry requires a search "reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference,"18 ' "consent" requires a balancing of public
safety and effectiveness against intrusion, 8 2 and general
reasonableness requires that the search is "no more extensive
nor intensive than necessary."183 So described, each doctrine
necessitates a properly tailored search that equally considers
the competing values of privacy and safety.
Therefore, despite a lack of consensus as to the particular
justification for administrative searches, reasonableness
Accordingly, in
remains the constitutional minimum." 4
determining the appropriate layer for body-scan searches, the
TSA must successfully and carefully balance the potential
security benefits of body-scan technology with basic Fourth
Amendment privacy protections.
III. BODY-SCAN SEARCHES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
RECONCILING SAFETY AND PRIVACY
As demonstrated by the events of 9/11, the safety of air
travelers and the general public alike depends on reliable
airport screening procedures.1 5 However, the proportionality
requirement of the Fourth Amendment requires that airport
security measures employ a degree of risk management that
appropriately considers the protection of personal privacy. In
178. Gibson v. Texas, 921 S.W.2d 747, 757 n.3 (Tex. App. 1996) (citing
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973)).

179. See, e.g., United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 804 n.15 (2d Cir.
1974); United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1973).
180. See, e.g., Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806-07; Kroll, 481 F.2d at 886.
181. Epperson, 454 F.2d at 771 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
182. United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973).
183. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007).
184. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
185. See Aukai, 497 F.3d at 956.
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fact, the TSA, conceding this point, seeks to employ a
"layered" security approach such that any single search tool
18 6
need not be overly invasive.
Given the invasive nature of body-scan devices,18 7 the
question remains as to how to appropriately tailor the use of
this technology in a manner that equally considers these
conflicting interests. Although current search methods and
technologies, such as walk-through magnetometers and patdown searches, fit neatly into present-day primary and
secondary search jurisprudence, uncertainty exists as to how
the TSA can implement the technology without impermissibly
infringing on Fourth Amendment rights.
8
A. Routine Body-Scan Searches Are Unconstitutional"
The TSA recently indicated that body-scan technology
may soon become the centerpiece of the "checkpoint of the
future," replacing magnetometers as the primary, routine
8 9
search mechanism deployed at all airport checkpoints.
Deploying body-scans in this manner, however, is an
unconstitutional use of the technology. As the following
discussion will show, requiring every domestic airline
passenger to display an outlined form of his body, absent
cause, does not strike the appropriate constitutional balance
between safety and privacy.

1.

Body-scans Are More Intrusive Than Walk-Through
Magnetometers

Airport security systems have evolved over time. 190
Today,
walk-through
magnetometers
are
seen
as
commonplace and routine, particularly in the setting of
airport screening."19 Accordingly, magnetometer searches are
widely upheld as a minimal invasion of privacy that "does not
1 92
annoy, frighten or humiliate those who pass through it.'
186. Hawley Testimony, supra note 23.

187. See discussion supra Part I.D.; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
188. While this comment focuses on the use of backscatter and millimeter
wave technology for scanning individual travelers, the same technology does
have tremendous potential to screen carry-on and checked luggage as well. See
SparapaniTestimony, supra note 128.
189. Kutz Testimony, supra note 2, at 9.
190. See Gibson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 747, 759 n.5 (Tex. App. 1996).
191. Id. at 759.
192. Id. at 758 (quoting United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 805-06 (2d
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Body-scan searches, however, are not constitutionally
comparable.
The privacy intrusions of backscatter and millimeter
wave devices are significant. 9 3 Absent the use of privacyfiltering software, the technology produces extremely detailed
images that expose intimate parts of the body and invade
basic privacy expectations.1 94 Not only do body-scans subject
travelers to this "virtual strip search," 95 but the search is
conducted in front of a captive audience of fellow travelers, all
apparently aware of the fact that this person's naked body is
being remotely viewed. 96
Therefore, as compared to
minimally invasive magnetometer searches, body-scans
present a much higher potential for humiliation.
Though the modern form of the technology, which
attempts to recapture some elements of privacy, is less
intrusive,' 9' the "chalk outline" image continues to present
significantly more privacy concerns than magnetometer
searches. First, the potential for humiliation continues to be
a concern. Many individuals desire to conceal highly personal
details of their bodies, such as evidence of surgeries,
implants, and medical devices. ' 9' Though many of these
items would likewise alert a magnetometer, body-scans would
detect additional non-metal items. Additionally, body-scans
do more than merely detect the presence of these objects; the
fact that the device produces an image is itself a source of
potential
humiliation
beyond
that
presented
by
magnetometers. 99
Second, body-scans present an opportunity for abuse that
does not exist in magnetometer searches."' Although the
TSA assures that the images cannot be saved, some privacy
experts continue to be wary that the images will be
reproduced or otherwise exploited by screening personnel,2 ' a
Cir. 1974)).

193. See discussion supra Part I.D.
194. See Miller, supra note 1.
195. See Yost, supra note 138.
196. Frank, supra note 113.
197. See discussion supra Part I.D.
198. Sparapani Testimony, supra note 128. The TSA has stated that bodyscans can detect implants larger than small pins, such as shoulder and knee
replacements. Yost, supra note 138.
199. See Saletan, supra note 67.
200. Sparapani Testimony, supra note 128.
201. Salemme, supra note 131.
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concern that simply does not exist with magnetometers.
Third, body-scan searches introduce a subjective element
into the primary screening process that does not exist with
magnetometer searches. While magnetometers automatically
detect metallic items, body-scans require the intervention of a
human element whereby a screening officer must subjectively
differentiate between threatening and non-threatening items
displayed on a screen.2 °2
This subjective feature implicates two potentially
intrusive scenarios not seen with magnetometer searches.
First, there is a fear that the screening officers may consider
race, sex, weight, or other impermissible factors when
determining whether the passenger poses a threat that
requires further inquiry.2 3 While the officers are remotely
located, the images are detailed in such a manner that a
screening officer could potentially be made aware of these
physical characteristics. 20 4 Again, magnetometers do not
present similar concerns.
Second, even absent the potential for prejudice, the
subjective element will likely result in a greater number of
unnecessary
secondary
searches
than magnetometer
searches.20 5 Regardless of their level of training, officers will
be faced with the difficult task of differentiating between
harmless devices, such as medical implants, and concealed
weapons and explosives. While the accuracy of the machines
is somewhat unknown, it stands to reason that devices of
similar shape and density to a threatening object would
similarly alert the attention of a screening officer, regardless
of whether the device is in fact threatening.2 6 In fact, the
privacy software in the modern form of the technology, while
minimizing the initial intrusion, could inevitably amplify
privacy concerns by diminishing the accuracy of the search.20 7
Accordingly, primary body-scan searches would potentially
lead to many unnecessary secondary searches that would not
otherwise result from a purely objective primary search.
202. SparapaniTestimony, supra note 128.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Press Release, Transportation Security Administration, TSA
Unveils Backscatter Technology Testing at Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport, supra
note 110.
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Finally, and along similar lines, the fact that body-scans
are more effective at detecting a wider range of dangerous
items alone increases the likelihood that use of the technology
will result in a larger number of false positive tests.2 °8 While
this fact makes body-scans more effective, it also makes them
more intrusive, in that more harmless passengers will be
subject to invasive secondary searches.2 °9
Given these many privacy concerns, body-scans do not
present a level of intrusion comparable to that of "minimally
invasive" magnetometer searches. To the contrary, in their
unprocessed form body-scans are more accurately comparable
to the "full" search condemned by the administrative search
doctrine, 21 while modified body-scans are more like a
"carefully limited search of the clothing," or a "physical
frisk."2 11 This fact, while alone not rendering mandatory
body-scans unconstitutional, raises serious questions as to
whether the Fourth Amendment would prevent the TSA from
instituting the technology as a routine search mechanism.
2. Routine Body-Scan SearchesAre Not Appropriately
Tailored to Satisfy the FourthAmendment
In addition to being far more intrusive than
magnetometer searches, routine body-scan searches are not
appropriately tailored to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. As
discussed above, the judicial framework of airport screening
searches requires that the scope of a given search is
appropriately tailored in a manner that equally considers
privacy and safety. 212 Accordingly, whether routine body-scan
searches are unconstitutionally oppressive necessarily
requires an inquiry into whether less-invasive alternatives
21 3
exist.
a.

The TSA Has Access to Minimally Invasive
"Primary"Search Alternatives

The 9/11 Commission stated plainly that "[n]o single

208. SparapaniTestimony, supra note 128.
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968).
211. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1972).
212. See supra Part II.
213. See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007); see also
discussion supra Part III.A.
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security measure is foolproof."21 4 Accordingly, the TSA is
invasive
alternative
minimally
developing
currently
technologies and procedures that have the potential to
improve the effectiveness of primary screening searches.2 15
These include the SPOT behavioral recognition program,
Secure Flight watch lists, and the use of less intrusive
emerging technologies such as EntryScan and handheld
explosive detection devices.2 16 Each of these, combined with
magnetometers, can be collectively used to create a minimally
intrusive, yet more proficient primary security layer.
Behavioral recognition programs such as SPOT operate
in a layer of security that employs human capital to
complement the use of technology in other primary
searches.21 7 If more widely deployed, 1 ' SPOT programs have
the potential to effectively detect threats presented by
nonmetallic weapons and explosives. 219 Despite concerns, this
program is carefully designed to prevent racial bias by
allowing officers to consider only "culturally independent,"
objective behavioral cues. 220 Furthermore, SPOT searches are
unseen by a vast majority of passengers, and those who
initially raise suspicion are subjected only to minimal
questioning.22 ' Of these individuals, less than twenty percent
must undergo a secondary search.2 22 Therefore, though the
search method remains in testing,2 23 SPOT has the potential
to become an additional minimally invasive tool in the

214. Hawley Testimony, supra note 23, at 4 (quoting THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 392 (2005)).

215. Kutz Testimony, supra note 2, at 4. The current layered approach
includes "intelligence gathering and analysis, checking passenger manifests
against watch lists, and assigning undercover air marshals to certain flights."

Id.
216. See discussion supra Part I.B.
217. Karp & Meckler, supra note 42. "It may be the only thing I know of that
favors the human solution instead of technology." Id. (quoting Kip Hawley,
Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration).
218. Id. ("Securities specialists say [SPOT] can enhance, but not replace,
existing detection machines and procedures.").
219. Id.
220. Press Release, Nat'l Sci. Found., New Technologies Could Make Airport
Screening More Effective and Less Cumbersome, supra note 43.
221. Karp & Meckler, supra note 42.
222. Id.
223. Press Release, Nat'l Sci. Found., New Technologies Could Make Airport
Screening More Effective and Less Cumbersome, supra note 43.
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primary search layer.
A second screening mechanism that is currently
underutilized is passenger watch-list screening, which uses a
minimal level of personally identifying information to screen
potentially dangerous individuals.224
The comprehensive
"Secure Flight" computer watch list program, currently in
development, presents an opportunity to further improve the
primary search system without having to implement
mandatory body-scan searches.2 25
Although privacy concerns exist surrounding the use of
this and similar database programs,22 6 the TSA has been
active in protecting passenger information from potential
leaks, 227 and continues to redesign the system with privacy
and accuracy as top priorities.2 28 If the TSA is successful in
implementing a program with accurate data that successfully
secures personal information, Secure Flight has the potential
to be a minimally intrusive primary search mechanism in
that it merely cross-checks basic information, such as name
and address, that already exist in government databases.2 29
The TSA is also actively developing and employing many
explosive-detection technologies that are potentially less
invasive than body-scans. 230 These technologies, including
EntryScan "puffers" and handheld detection devices, have the
ability to
detect
explosive
materials
invisible
to
magnetometers. 231' Given this capability, the technologies can
be more widely used as either primary, secondary, or random
searches to improve general explosive detection capabilities
232
without requiring an invasive "virtual strip search."
Finally, in addition to technological shortcomings, the
TSA audits uncovered numerous procedural deficiencies,
224. Secure Flight Program, supra note 39.
225. Id.; see also discussion supra Part I.B.2.
226. Secure Flight Program, supra note 39.
227. Id. ("TSA will not collect or use commercial data to conduct Secure
Flight watch list matching.").
228. Id. ("TSA requested comments on the data elements through the
rulemaking process to determine whether date of birth and gender should be
mandatory data elements, and will consider all comments received.").
229. Id.
230. See discussion supra Part I.B.4.
231. See discussion supra Parts I.B.4, I.D.
232. Yost, supra note 138. Alessandra Soler Meetze, executive director of the
ACLU's Arizona chapter, prefers the Entry Scan "puffers" as a less intrusive
alternative to body-scans. Id.
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including inattentive management and a general lack of
effective TSO training.23 3 Therefore, technology should not be
considered the single and exclusive remedial measure; the
TSA must take appropriate action to ensure the vigilance of
screening officers prior to resorting to invasive technologies
such as body-scanners.
b.

Routine Body-Scan SearchesAre Not Sufficiently
Effective to Justify the Additional Invasion of
Privacy

The constitutional limits of primary checkpoint searches
are evaluated by careful consideration of efficacy and
privacy. 234 Having established that potentially effective, less
invasive searches exist, the question remains as to whether
the additional safeguards offered by body-scan searches
beyond those available from these alternatives justify the
additional invasion of privacy. This comment argues that
although body-scans likely offer detection capabilities beyond
the available alternatives, such incremental improvements
fall out of proportion with the alarming invasive qualities of
the body-scan technology when it is used as a primary search.
First, body-scan machines should not be considered a
"cure-all" solution in such a manner that could potentially
justify their invasive qualities. The detection capabilities of
body-scan machines are still largely unknown-while the
TSA is pleased with the initial test results, it still remains to
be seen whether body-scan searches are truly effective at
detecting weapons and explosives.235 Further, in addition to
contributing to the invasiveness of body-scans, the subjective
236 also
characteristics of the technology, discussed previously,
2 7
themselves.
searches
mitigates the effectiveness of the
Moreover, while the government has made steps to
mitigate the invasive qualities of the technology, those very
same efforts degrade the technology's detection capability to
the point where it loses the ability to detect certain

233. OIG AUDIT, supra note 3, at 5.
234. See discussion supra Part II.D.
235. See Hawley Testimony, supra note 23, at 6; Frank, supra note 113.
236. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
237. See id. Further questions remain regarding the efficiency, speed, and
size of the machines. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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threatening objects.2 38 While the modified, "masking" form of
the technology would likely still enhance detection
capabilities over current technologies,23 9 potential terrorists
would have a dangerous advantage: knowledge of what kinds
of modern weapons can still evade detection.24 °
Therefore, in order for the technology to significantly
enhance detection capability, the images would have to be
graphic. However, the graphic, unmodified form of the
technology, which exposes genitalia and fat folds among other
private parts of the body, 41 is more analogous to a "full"
search than it is to a "minimally invasive" magnetometer
search. Therefore, despite the potential for substantial
improvements in detection capability, the unmodified
technology "peers beneath clothing" in a manner that per se
violates the tailoring requirement of the administrative
search doctrine.2 42 Meanwhile, the modified images, given
their sacrificed detection capability, do not offer the kind of
substantial improvement in detection capability to justify the
still highly invasive nature of the technology.24 3
Accordingly, while difficult to quantify, the detection
capability of modified body-scan searches is less than perfect,
if not substantially deficient. Therefore, the undoubtedly
substantial escalation in privacy invasion over that resulting
from magnetometers and alternative emerging technologies
is, most likely, out of proportion with the incremental gain in
detection capability. While modern travelers are accustomed
to "commonplace," minimally invasive magnetometer
searches, the modified body-scan technology invades a basic
expectation of privacy beneath one's clothing that is not
justified by anything less than a substantially significant
improvement in detection capability. Consequently, because
the unmodified version of the technology is overly invasive to
238. See Press Release, Transportation Security Administration, TSA
Unveils Backscatter Technology Testing at Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport, supra
note 110.
239. See Frank, supra note 113.
240. See id. (stating that the modified images lose the ability to detect C4
explosives).
241. Airport Body Search May Reveal More Than Passengers Know, supra
note 126.
242. See discussion supra Part II.D. It seems as if the TSA would concede
this point by the simple fact that they have made steps to implement the
masking technology rather than proceeding with the more invasive search.
243. See discussion supra Part I.D.3.
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the point where no improvement in detection capability would
justify its use, routine body-scan searches are, in either form,
unconstitutionally "more intensive than necessary; "24 neither
the modified or unmodified versions of the technology strike
the appropriate constitutional balance.
This conclusion, however, does not address whether the
technology may nevertheless have a constitutionally
appropriate place in a successive security layer, where the
circumstances present an elevated risk of harm.
B. Modified Body-Scans Are Less Intrusive and More
Effective Than Pat-Down Searches
The privacy protections built into modern body-scan
technology have mitigated the Fourth Amendment concerns
surrounding their use.245 Although more invasive than walkthrough magnetometers,2 46 present day body-scans offer a less
invasive and more effective security tool than pat-down
searches.247
1.

Body-Scan Searches Are Less Intrusive Than PatDowns

While comparing the invasive qualities of two dissimilar
searches may prove problematic, modified body-scan searches
appear to be less intrusive than current TSA pat-down
procedures. Unlike body-scans, which produce a remote
image, pat-down searches involve significant physical
intrusion. 24 The searches subject travelers to contact with
intimate parts of their bodies, a process that is potentially
degrading and humiliating.2 49 Furthermore, pat-downs
present a risk of inappropriate mishandling and sexual
250
groping.
Conversely, modified body-scan images involve a
significantly lower invasion of privacy.25 '
The "chalk

244.
United
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973)).
See discussion supra Part I.D.3.
See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
See Goo, supra note 63; see also discussion supra Part I.B.3.
See id.; see also Lew, supra note 65.
Lew, supra note 65.
See discussion supra Part I.B.3.

246

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:49

outline"" 2 form rendered by the machine is effective in
masking both the identity of the individual and many of the
private details of the human form. 253 Furthermore, because
the body-scan officer and image are remotely located, the
invasion of privacy is more subtle and not as readily apparent
to the awaiting passengers as is a pat-down.25 4 This machine
interface is not present in pat-downs, and thus further
mitigates the potential for humiliation created by the
awaiting passengers and the security officer.25 5
Finally, the fact that body-scans do not require human
contact appears to significantly mitigate the public's concern
regarding the invasiveness of the search. While operating the
pilot program in Phoenix, the TSA reports that ninety percent
of individuals subject to a secondary search opted in favor of a
body-scan over a pat-down.25 6 Assuming that the passengers'
consent is informed (in that they know what a body-scan
entails), the overwhelming passenger preference for bodyscans is an indication that physical pat-down searches are
more invasive than remotely located imaging.
2. Body-Scan Searches Are More Effective Than PatDowns
Finally, body-scan searches, even in their modified form,
are a more effective security tool than pat-downs.2 5 ' Though
the TSA has been somewhat secretive surrounding body-scan
test results, the technology is presumptively more accurate
for two primary reasons.
First, while body-scans render an image of the entire
body, the effectiveness of a pat-down search is limited to its
permissible parameters. 2 8
Although pat-downs
are
252. Press Release, Transportation Security Administration, TSA Unveils
Backscatter Technology Testing at Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport, supra note 110.
253. See Saletan, supra note 67.
254. See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
255. See Saletan, supra note 67 ("Putting a machine interface between you
and the examining officer protects your visual as well as tactile privacy ...
[Tihe officer who sees you on the monitor never sees you in the flesh.")
256. Transportation Security Administration, Our Approach: Whole Body
Imaging, supra note 108.
257. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 113. However, the TSA will not divulge
precisely what does and does not show up in the images and will not say
whether the machines have yet to successfully detect dangerous objects. Yost,
supra note 138.
258. See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
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invasive, 259 searching officers are not permitted to search
every part of the body,260 such as inside religious headwear,2 6 1
or in or around sensitive parts of the body.262 Furthermore,
when searching more sensitive, yet permissible areas, the
officers are required to use the back of their hand, further
limiting their ability to detect hidden items. 263 Therefore, not
only does this limit the effectiveness of the search, but it gives
those wishing to surpass the security system the knowledge
of where to hide a dangerous item, i.e. in-between breasts,
genitalia, or in a prosthetic. 2" Body-scans, having the ability
to detect items located in these areas, are not similarly
limited.
Second, the potential for human error in pat-down
searches is more prevalent. While a body-scan searching
officer must recognize an object projected onto a screen, a patdown officer must be able to detect a hidden item by touch
alone. Therefore, the officer conducting the pat-down must be
able to differentiate between threatening and harmless
objects below one or more layers of clothing, and further, the
officer must be trusted to execute a comprehensive search
without passing over any areas of the body. While similar
shortcomings exist in body-scan searches, they are not as
prevalent; the officer is not given as much discretion as to the
extent of the search, nor does it take any further effort on his
or her behalf to reach its permissible scope. It stands to
reason, therefore, that image-based detection technology,
even in its modified form, is more effective than a restricted
pat-down search.
Body-scans are, therefore, a more effective, yet less
invasive search than a pat-down. That being the case, the
most logical use of the technology resides in place of pat-down
259. See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
260. See, e.g., Goo, supra note 63 ("Airport security screeners . . . will be
instructed not to touch women passengers between their breasts as part of new
pat-down procedures, the Transportation Security Administration said.").
261. The Sikh Coalition, TSA Develops New Procedure for Screening
Turbans
at
U.S.
Airports,
Oct.
17,
2007,
http://www.sikhcoalition.orgladvisories/TSADevelopsNewProcedure.htm.
262. See Coo, supra note 63.
263. Legalmatch.com, Inappropriate Pat-down Searches During an Airport
Security
Screening,
http://www.legalmatch.comlawlibrary/article/inappropriate-pat-down-searches-during-an-airport-securityscreening.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
264. Id.
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searches in the secondary security layer.
IV. PROPOSAL: IMPLEMENT BODY-SCANS AS A SECONDARY
SEARCH MECHANISM
Although body-scan machines are a promising security
tool,265 use of the technology in an overly invasive manner is
not justified merely because it adds a degree of safety.26 6
Given the particularly intrusive nature of this technology,2 67
the constitutionally appropriate "checkpoint of the future" is
one where the modified form of the technology is utilized not
in place of magnetometers, but instead, as a secondary search
in place of pat-downs. Use of body-scans after there is
"reason to conduct" a secondary search strikes the
appropriate balance between the imperative goals of securing
our nation's airports and acknowledging basic privacy
interests.268
As previously set forth, this proposal relies on two
theories: that body-scans are unreasonable when used as
primary searches, and that body-scans offer a more effective
yet less intrusive alternative to pat-down searches.2 6 9 Given
this framework, body-scan searches are most appropriate
when deployed in the secondary security layer.
A.

PrimaryBody-Scan Searches Are Unconstitutional

As demonstrated, use of body-scans on a routine basis is
unconstitutionally "more intensive than necessary."270 While
the searches would likely incrementally improve detection
capability, the masking technology degrades the ability of the
scans to see certain threatening objects to the point where
that gain falls short of a substantial improvement.
Absent a substantial gain in detection capability, the
invasive qualities
of the modified
technology are
proportionately outweighed by the substantial additional
invasion of privacy.27 1 Furthermore, absent the masking
265. See discussion supra Part I.D.
266. See discussion supra Part III.A.
267. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
268. See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007).
269. See discussion supra Part III.B.
270. Aukai, 497 F.3d at 960 (quoting United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893,
908 (9th Cir. 1973)).
271. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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technology, the technology ceases to provide the necessary
basic Fourth Amendment protections guaranteed by the
administrative search doctrine. Use of body-scans in either
its original or modified form as a primary search, therefore,
does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment balancing test.272
B. Secondary Body-Scan Searches Are Constitutional
After a screening officer establishes a "reason to conduct"
a secondary search,27 3 an enhanced privacy invasion is
justified if it is appropriately tailored in scope to protection of
the aircraft, its passengers, and the general public.274 As
discussed previously, body-scans are advantageous over
present-day secondary searches because they offer a lessintrusive alternative that is more effective at detecting
dangerous weapons and explosives.2 7 5 Therefore, given that
276
reasonable pat-down searches are held to be constitutional,
and that body-scans are more appropriately tailored
secondary searches,2 77 it is logical to conclude that secondary
body-scans are constitutionally permissible.
C. The TSA Must Continue to PursueMinimally Invasive
Primaryand Secondary Search Tools
This proposal presupposes that the TSA will continue to
develop security procedures across all levels of human capital,
procedures, and technologies.
Currently, available security
systems lack the ability to intercept modern explosive
devices. 27 9 Therefore, the TSA must continue to develop and
implement minimally invasive search technologies in the
primary search layer so that mandatory body-scans do not, at
some unforeseen time, become a necessary evil.

272. See discussion supra Part III.A.
273. Again, this comment does not address whether the TSA guidelines for
determining when an individual fails a primary search are constitutionally
justified.
274. See supra Part II.
275. See discussion supra Part III.B.
276. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Pages, 767 F.2d 776 (11th cir. 1985).
277. See discussion supra Part III.B.
278. See Kutz Testimony, supra note 2 (recommending that the TSA improve
those three areas); see also discussion supra Part I.B.
279. See Kutz Testimony, supra note 2 (report to Congress on the
vulnerabilities of current security screening procedures as exposed through
covert testing by the Government Accountability Office).
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At the same time, the TSA must continue to make strides
to guarantee the constitutional application of secondary bodyscan searches. This means that routine, primary searches
must judge objective criteria and be designed to detect true
threats. Though primary searches will necessarily lead to
some false positive tests, the TSA must continue efforts to
minimize the potential for arbitrary and oppressive
interference with personal privacy.2"' This means not only
utilizing the current "masking" technology, but also seeking
further privacy protections that do not substantially mitigate
detection capability.
Otherwise, shielding the general
traveling public from unnecessary body-scan searches by
using them in the secondary layer is just an illusory
protection.
CONCLUSION
Domestic airport security systems are ill-equipped to
meet the challenge of modern security threats.2 8 1 Given the

particular elusiveness of modem weapons, it is imperative
that technologies are developed and implemented to remedy
an inadequate security system.2" 2 However, the emerging
role of technology in airport screening procedures implicates a
fundamental question-to what extent should privacy be
subrogated for increased public safety?
This question is particularly relevant in the case of bodyscanning technologies, which have the ability to produce
invasive images of the human body.28 3 Though apparently
effective at detecting various types of threatening objects,28 4
the unmodified form of the technology produces extremely
invasive images comparable to the "full" search condemned by
the administrative search doctrine.28 5 While the government
claims that the masking software adequately addresses these
concerns, the problem is that the modification degrades the
images to the point where the technology no longer has the
280. Gibson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 747, 757 (Tex. App. 1996). For instance, the
TSA has made an effort to evaluate only objective, race neutral criteria in its
SPOT program. Hawley Testimony, supra note 23.
281. See Kutz Testimony, supra note 2.
282. Id.
283. See discussion supra Part I.D.
284. See discussion supra Part I.D.
285. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968).
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ability to detect some threatening objects. Therefore, because
the modified technology still requires a substantially more
invasive search over existing alternatives, the technology's
diminished detection capability fails to justify using it as a
primary search mechanism.2 86
Though impermissible as a primary search, body-scans
do have a constitutionally appropriate place in the airport
security system.2 87
If implemented appropriately as a
secondary search tool, modified body-scans have the potential
both to improve detection capabilities and to provide more
respect for the privacy interests of suspicious passengers.2 88
Therefore, despite the growing prevalence of intrusive
technologies, there can be some comfort in the fact that
improving detection capabilities and recognizing basic Fourth
Amendment rights do not have to be mutually exclusive
goals.

286. See discussion supra Part I.D.3.
287. See discussion supra Part IV.
288. See discussion supra Part III.

